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Insights Gleaned from the Tragedy 
at Virginia Tech 
Lucinda Roy∗ 
My thanks to Professor Ann Massie for inviting me to speak to you 
today.  There is no more challenging issue we face in education than this 
one.  The threat of violence on campus requires a coordinated, proactive 
approach on the part of institutions; it challenges many of the assumptions 
we have about risk management and about education in the United States.1 
Years ago, when I served as an associate dean at Virginia Tech, I was 
frequently invited to deliver keynotes on the impact of the new instructional 
technology being introduced on our campuses.  One of the things some of 
us realized was this:  unless we focused not only on the technology itself, 
but also on the prevailing culture—the expectations we had for our 
students, our assumptions about the ways in which students learned—we 
would be wasting our time.  In other words, unless fundamental changes 
took place in the way we did business, classrooms could become sites of 
delivery rather than places of responsive, collaborative learning; minority 
students could be left behind; and instructional technology could become 
the latest means by which administrators strapped for cash enacted cost-
savings. 
I mention this now because it has become clear to me as I worked for 
the past two years on No Right to Remain Silent2—my new book about 
what we can learn from what happened before, during, and after the tragedy 
at Virginia Tech—that effective approaches are being hampered by 
assumptions about the roles of students, faculty, administrators, and support 
personnel.3  I tried to summarize the problems we face in the prologue of 
my book: 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ See generally Biographical Info for Lucinda Roy, http://www.lucindaroy.net/bio 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2010) (giving the personal and professional biography of author 
Lucinda Roy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 1. See infra notes 4–8 and accompanying text. 
 2. LUCINDA ROY, NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT:  THE TRAGEDY AT VIRGINIA TECH 
(2009) [hereinafter ROY]. 
 3. See infra note 5 and accompanying text. 
94 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 093 (2010) 
Our education system is premised on the belief that students are willing 
to abide by the rules we establish and that they will seek help when they 
need it.  Yet there are times when those who are mentally ill are not 
equipped to make a rational choice about such things as medication or 
counseling.  At moments like these, who is morally obliged to 
intervene?  The teacher, the parent, another student, a counselor, law 
enforcement?  And what are the legal ramifications of intervention?  In 
the United States, the legal options in the case of students who exhibit 
signs of being deeply troubled are less plentiful than we imagine.  So we 
play a game of Russian roulette in education and in mental health, 
shuffling too many troubled young people through the system, 
convincing ourselves that no student would be crazy enough to load a 
gun and point it at someone’s head.4 
After a student attack, we are forced to interrogate long-held 
assumptions about education, mental health, the innocence of youth, 
privacy rights, free speech, families, and gun laws.5  But in the wake of 
tragedy, we are often more comfortable talking about surveillance cameras 
and security personnel.  Important though these are, they can only be 
effective if we also examine the cultural impediments to campus security.6  
The education field and the public are not yet prepared to meet the 
challenges posed by troubled or severely disturbed students.7  I say this not 
just because of Seung-Hui Cho’s brutal attack on a campus I love, but also 
because I am convinced attacks are inevitable if we do not do a better job of 
responding to students in crisis.8 
Because I agreed to speak to the media in the two days following the 
tragedy, I found myself in the unique position of hearing from hundreds of 
others from around the country—teachers, parents, counselors, lawyers, and 
                                                                                                                 
 4. ROY, supra note 2, at 8. 
 5. See id. at 3 ("This tragedy forces us to address some of the most pressing issues of 
our time:  education, parenting, violence, youth subcultures, communication, censorship, 
mental health, gun control, and race."). 
 6. See DEADLY LESSONS:  UNDERSTANDING LETHAL SCHOOL VIOLENCE, CASE 
STUDIES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE COMMITTEE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 253–54 (Mark H. 
Moore et al. eds., 2003) (describing the effects of a popular culture that tolerates and even 
exalts violence on young people and school safety) [hereinafter DEADLY LESSONS]. 
 7. See ROY, supra note 2, at 167–69 (explaining the challenges that students like Cho 
thrust on an educational model built on conceptions of the "Perfect Student").  Roy describes 
the educational system as "unresponsive" and plagued by an exodus of quality teachers and 
the absence of adequate resources.  Id. at 183.  Many schools have difficulty identifying and 
engaging troubled students on a large scale.  Id. at 234. 
 8. See id. at 239 (describing the troubled, isolated individuals who, like Cho, dream 
of attacking their classmates and the threat they pose to society if the government, 
communities, schools, educators and law enforcement fail to address root causes). 
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administrators—many of whom believed that a similar tragedy could 
happen in almost any school or college at any time.9  Since Columbine, we 
have known our campuses are vulnerable not just to attacks by students but 
also to attacks from outsiders.10  This is why a symposium such as this one 
is so important.  I am not here today to sound the knell of doom; rather, I 
am hoping, if we dare to speak honestly about the challenges we face in K–
16 (our elementary, middle, and high schools, as well as our college and 
universities) we can come up with creative approaches that take into 
account the rights of students to privacy, while balancing these individual 
rights against the safety of the community.11 
Ironically, the education field is often resistant to learning from 
experience.  Nowadays, men and women who have not set foot in a 
classroom for years, or may never have worked with students, are hired into 
administrative positions.12  Some have about as much familiarity with 
students as they have with Old Icelandic—a language I studied while a 
student at King’s College—one that is particularly useful should you run 
into a stray Viking.13  Many have little or no training in risk management.14 
Public education is now only partially subsidized by the state, which 
means that administrators are often hired because of their proven track 
record as fundraisers.15  In D. H. Lawrence’s story The Rocking-Horse 
Winner, a house constantly whispers, "There must be more money."16  
                                                                                                                 
 9. See id. at 248–51 (describing the variety of responses received from people around 
the country following the attack).  "[I]n their hearts even the lucky people knew 
that . . . what happened [at Virginia Tech] could happen anywhere."  Id. at 10. 
 10. See id. at 220 (discussing the vulnerability of classrooms to attack). 
 11. See id. at 166 ("I am loathe to suggest that we should explore ways to curtail 
students’ right to free speech.  And yet, the tragedy at Virginia Tech obliges us to take 
another look at some of our assumptions about education and creativity."). 
 12. See id. at 129 (describing a shift in the past decade in the experience required of 
university administrators from student-centered leadership to fundraising ability). 
 13. See id. ("Nowadays, some of those in leadership positions at universities have little 
experience working with students and almost no experience in the classroom."). 
 14. See ASS’N  OF GOVERNING BDS. OF UNIVS. AND COLL. & UNITED EDUCATORS, THE 
STATE OF ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES TODAY 2 (2009), 
available at http://www.epi.soe.vt.edu/perspectives/ policy_news/pdf/AGB_RISK.pdf 
(finding a majority of administrators in higher education do not use comprehensive, strategic 
risk assessment to identify major risks). 
 15. See ROY, supra note 2, at 133 ("The corporate model of the jet-setting, 
entrepreneurial CEO is a model university presidents have been forced to adopt.  Their 
boards expect them to raise funds, their governors expect them to do so as well, their faculty 
complain when they don’t, and voters are increasingly reluctant to fund education."). 
 16. D. H. LAWRENCE, The Rocking-Horse Winner, in THE WOMAN WHO RODE AWAY 
AND OTHER STORIES 230, 239 (Dieter Mehl & Christa Jansohn eds., 1995). 
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Often, this whispered refrain is what assaults many administrators, who are 
obliged to do more with less, keep their campuses safe, and convince an 
ever more skeptical public and state legislature that education is worth 
funding.17 
In No Right to Remain Silent, I list ten reasons why I think we may be 
heading for a perfect storm in education:18  
1. A shortage of teachers and resources in K–1219 
2. A lack of treatment facilities and services for mentally ill 
students of all ages20 
3. The accessibility of guns and bomb-making equipment and 
manuals21 
4. The prevalence of mental illness and suicide in the student 
population22  
                                                                                                                 
 17. See ROY, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 18. See ROY, supra note 2, at 226–27 (listing the cultural factors that "have the 
potential to contribute to education’s perfect storm"). 
 19. See OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC. POLICY & BUDGET DEV. STAFF, U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., TEACHER SHORTAGE AREAS, NATIONWIDE LISTING 1990–91 THRU 2010–11 (2010), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/pol/tsa.pdf (illustrating how 
widespread teacher shortages are in the United States and revealing chronic shortages of 
math, science and special education teachers). 
 20. See Greg Esposito, Tech Gets Funds To Keep Healing Going, ROANOKE TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 2008 (describing the services for mentally ill students at Virginia Tech before and 
after the tragedy).  Schools and universities are seeing increasing demands placed on mental 
health services by students, but many do not have enough mental health professionals on 
staff.  Id.  Experts have recommended that the ratio of counselors to students should be about 
1 to 1,500.  Id.  At Virginia Tech before the shootings, the ratio was 1 to 2,700.  Id.  In 
October 2008, well over a year after the shootings, Virginia Tech received $2.65 million in 
federal funds to hire six new counselors at the Cook Counseling Center, and case manager 
positions in Student Affairs.   Id.   There are now 1,750 students to every counselor.  Id.  The 
CCC handled 11,065 student visits in academic year 2007–2008.  Id.  This is up sharply 
from 2005–2006 when the center had approximately 7,145 student visits.  Id. 
 21. See ROY, supra note 2, at 213–39 (discussing the prevalence of guns and violence 
in American society). 
 22. See Jennifer Sisk, Depression on College Campuses:  The Downside of Higher 
Education, 6 SOC. WORK TODAY 17, 18 (discussing the unprecedented numbers of students 
suffering from depression on college campuses).  The prevalence of depression on college 
campuses is cause for concern.  Id.  One psychologist calls the statistics "staggering."  Id.  
College-aged students are more likely to experience depression than other age groups, 
according to published studies, statistics from mental health organizations, and observations 
by social workers and other professionals working with the college population.  Id. at 18–19.  
"The 2005 National College Health Assessment (NCHA), a survey of nearly 17,000 college 
students conducted by the American College Health Association, revealed that 25% reported 
they ‘felt so depressed it was difficult to function’ three to eight times during the past year 
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5. A "non-teacherly focus" in higher education23 
6. A pop culture that routinely exposes children and youth to 
excessive violence24   
7. A growing divide that separates youth culture from adult 
culture25 
8. The prevalence of bullying in K–12 (often called "harassment" 
when it affects the adult community)26 
9. A rise in alcoholism, drug abuse, and prescription medication 
abuse in student populations27 
10. Open campuses with relatively little security or security 
funding28 
Each of these factors is, on its own, cause for concern.  But it is the 
cumulative effect of these ten that should trouble us the most.  We are 
witnessing an exodus of dedicated, experienced teachers—something 
exacerbated by the current budget crisis.29  These veteran teachers have a 
vital role to play with regard to troubled students in need of intervention.30   
                                                                                                                 
and 21% reported they ‘seriously considered suicide’ one or more times during the past 
year."  Id. at 18.  "In the NCHA survey, students also ranked depression as one of the top ten 
impediments to academic performance."  Id. at 18. 
 23. See ROY, supra note 2, at 133 (discussing the preference of colleges and 
universities for administrators trained in fundraising rather than teaching).  Many research 
institutions also prefer professors committed to research first and teaching second.  Id. at 
178. 
 24. See id. at 198 ("It is naïve to expect that violence can be prevalent in one sphere 
(popular culture) and absent in another (the culture of school)."). 
 25. See DEADLY LESSONS, supra note 6, at 253 (explaining that the absence of adults 
from the lives of many young people may make young people more susceptible to violent 
influences from the media and their peers). 
 26. See id. at 316–17 (estimating that half of American children are victims of 
bullying, including many school shooters). 
 27. See 2009 PARENTS AND TEENS ATTITUDE TRACKING STUDY REPORT, PARTNERSHIP 
FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA AND METLIFE FOUNDATION 11 (2009), available at 
http://drugfreetexas.org/wp-content/files_flutter/1267743014PATS_Full_Report_2009_PDF.pdf 
(finding a reverse in the decline of drug and alcohol use in teens for the first time since 
1998). 
 28. See ROY, supra note 2, at 131 (noting that even in the semester after the attack, 
when caution and resources were at their greatest, it was impossible to completely secure the 
campus). 
 29. See OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC. POLICY & BUDGET DEV. STAFF, supra note 
19 and accompanying text. 
 30. See ROY, supra note 2, at 177 (recommending that experienced teachers be part of 
the threat assessment teams proposed as a way to identify troubled and potentially dangerous 
students). 
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Two-and-a-half years after the attack at Virginia Tech—sometimes 
referred to as Higher Education’s 9-1131—how far have we come?  If there 
can be an attack on Fort Hood as there was on November 5, 2009, how 
much easier is it to attack a campus?32 
Our campuses are vulnerable.33  In most cases, people can stroll into 
classes at any time.34 The only thing protecting us from attack is other 
people’s good will.  Twice in the past year I have had people show up in 
my classes unannounced.  One was a stranger who happened to be passing 
through Blacksburg.  I had no idea who he was, and it was very difficult to 
determine whether or not I should confront the visitor—an older man—
while my students were present.  This is not to suggest that schools and 
universities have ignored the problem.  In the wake of the attack in 
Blacksburg, schools, colleges, and universities have reassessed their 
approach to campus safety.35  At Virginia Tech, for example, a campus-
wide alert system has been instituted;36  police vacancies at Virginia Tech 
have been filled;37 a threat assessment specialist has been hired;38 case 
managers have been funded through a grant obtained from the U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See Kathleen A. Rinehart, Higher Education’s 9-11:  Crisis Management, 
UNIVERSITY BUSINESS (Dec. 2007), http://www.universitybusiness.com/viewarticle.aspx? 
articleid=967 (calling the tragedy at Virginia Tech "Higher Education’s 9-11") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 32. See Robert D. McFadden, Army Doctor Held in Ft. Hood Rampage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 6, 2009, at A1 (reporting on the attack at Ft. Hood on November 5, 2009 that left 
thirteen dead and thirty wounded). 
 33. See ROY, supra note 2, at 131 (noting that even in the semester following the 
attack, when caution was at its height, the Virginia Tech campus was not completely secure). 
 34. See id. at 293 (explaining that even though locks have been installed on the 
classroom doors at Virginia Tech, most professors are reluctant to use them because they do 
not want to exclude latecomers). 
 35. See Kevin Johnson, Universities Rethink Unarmed Police, USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-19-campuscops_N.htm ("The April 
16 tragedy, the deadliest campus shooting in U.S. history, prompted a national reassessment 
of campus security plans, including whether to arm police who had not previously carried 
guns.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 36. See ROY, supra note 2, at 293 (describing the "very efficient" emergency 
notification system consisting of e-mail, cell phone, landline and siren warning alerts). 
 37. See id. (stating that the Virginia Tech Police Department has hired new personnel). 
 38. See Mark Owczarski, Gene Deisinger Named Deputy Chief of Police, Director of 
Threat Management Services (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/articles/ 
2009/08/2009-579.html (announcing the hire of Dr. Deisinger and his background including 
work with the FBI, Secret Service, and U.S. Department of Education regarding threat 
assessment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
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Department of Education;39 Dr. Marisa Randazzo from Threat Assessment 
International visited the campus in September of this year to discuss the 
role of faculty and staff in assessing threatening behavior;40 the Center for 
Peace Studies and Violence Prevention now resides in Norris Hall, the 
classroom building where the attack took place;41 a report chaired by Dean 
Jerry Niles resulted, among other things, in the creation of a threat 
assessment team;42 and efforts have been made by Counseling Services and 
Student Affairs to advise faculty about how to respond to troubled 
students.43 
Sadly, however, campuses where attacks occur can become places 
where profound silence about the specifics of what happened before, 
during, and after an attack is maintained.44  Frank discussion about events 
relating to Seung-Hui Cho himself or to Virginia Tech’s own troubled 
history with troubled students has not occurred on our campus, in part 
because it is still such a painful subject for those already emotionally, 
psychologically, and sometimes physically wounded.  But this is not the 
only reason for the silence.  As I explore in No Right to Remain Silent, there 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See U.S. Department of Education Awards More than $960,000 Grant to Virginia 
Tech, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www2.ed.gov/news/ 
pressreleases/2007/09/09212007a.html (stating that the "Assessing and Responding to At-
Risk Behaviors in a Higher Education Setting:  A Virginia Tech Demonstration Project" 
grant includes funds for case management) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 40. See The Critical Role of Faculty and Staff in Identifying Threats and Preventing 
Campus Violence, VIRGINIA TECH CENTER FOR INSTRUCTIONAL DEV. & EDUC. RES. (Sept. 
2009), http://www.cider.vt.edu/announcements.html (announcing Dr. Randazzo’s 
presentation on September 24, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 41. See ROY, supra note 2, at 293 (describing the creation of a Center for Peace 
Studies and Violence Prevention in Norris Hall, where students will be able to earn an 
interdisciplinary minor in peace studies). 
 42. See PRESIDENTIAL INTERNAL REVIEW:  WORKING GROUP REPORT ON THE 
INTERFACE BETWEEN VIRGINIA TECH COUNSELING SERVICES, ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL 
AFFAIRS AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 2 (Aug. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/documents/2007-08-22_internal_communications.pdf (recommending 
the creation of threat assessment teams). 
 43. See Virginia Tech Threat Assessment Team:  Resources on Campus, VA. TECH, 
http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu/resources/concerning_behaviors/index.html#Facultywor
ried (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (listing procedures for a faculty member worried about a 
student) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 44. See ROY, supra note 2, at 4 ("After the tragedy . . . it was as if collective selective 
mutism had descended upon an administration determined to keep silent in the face of harsh 
criticism."). 
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are other important reasons for this response.45  Among them—a justifiable 
fear of litigation, and an equally understandable wariness of the media.46  In 
a chapter entitled "The First Amendment," I describe it in this way: 
Those who knew anything about Cho were balanced precariously on the 
rim of free speech.  A variety of critics perched next to us, waiting to 
dissect every word.  The media had taken up residence on the rim, 
secreting the tabloids underneath their jackets.  Next to the media sat the 
twins FERPA and HIPAA, coy and tight-lipped, unwilling to reveal 
much about what you could and couldn’t say about the academic or 
medical records of the perpetrator, and next to them the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) stood poised to ambush those who mentioned guns 
in the same breath as Seung-Hui Cho because, as the NRA proclaimed 
for years with its perverse logic, "Guns don’t kill people, people kill 
people."  Next in line were the accusers eager to blame someone for 
something—anything at all, it didn’t really matter.  And alongside them 
was the supreme deity—the Internet.  Patient and brooding, it was 
capable of consigning you to the everlasting purgatory of recycled bad 
news.  Once snared by the Web, you could never really escape.  Say the 
wrong thing and the Net could multiply it a million times over before 
you could stutter, "I d-d-didn’t mean it."  Was it any wonder that 
people . . . were reluctant to say anything?47 
At a symposium like this, where dialogue is measured and rhetoric 
carefully constructed, solutions can appear easier to devise than they 
actually are.  As a poet and a novelist, I understand the potency of words, 
but I also know they can be unreliable, convincing us we have found 
solutions before we know the pervasiveness and dimensions of the problem.  
When we quote statistics, talk about trends, devise laws to make things 
better and invent protocols designed to keep us safe, we often forget to take 
into account the messiest part of the equation:  human beings who refuse to 
behave according to formulas we have devised for them, and cultures 
resistant to change.  Whatever strategies we come up with must also take 
into account the fact that many educational institutions, facing severe 
budget cuts, are struggling to cater to students who are not troubled, let 
alone those who are.48 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 46. See ROY, supra note 2, at 4–5 (citing fear of litigation as one cause of the silence 
of the administration).   After NBC News published the materials sent by Cho there was 
significant backlash against the media at large.  Id. at 86–95. 
 47. Id. at 141–42. 
 48. See id. at 135 (explaining that the chronic underfunding of state universities 
contributes to teacher shortages and threatens the ability of institutions to respond to 
troubled students). 
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At this point I want to suggest that we be wary of linking suicide with 
homicide when we speak of troubled students.  Over the past thirty years, I 
have worked with thousands of students here and in the United Kingdom 
and West Africa who—sometimes as a result of abuse or trauma—are 
severely depressed and even suicidal.  We should not assume that suicide 
and homicide are two sides of the same coin.49  Gary Pavela’s 
compassionate examination of mental disabilities is something we must 
take to heart.50  When we address this issue it can be tempting to demonize 
difference and unfairly castigate youth.  Though a significant number of 
students may struggle with depression and even have thoughts of suicide at 
some point during their college careers, most would never dream of 
launching an attack on their peers.  I say this because we run into dangerous 
territory when we suggest that young people as a whole pose a threat, or 
assert that we have bred a new species of "superpredators."51  As Dewey G. 
Cornell wisely points out in School Violence:  Fear Versus Facts, in the 
past, this fear resulted in punitive approaches and unenlightened 
legislation.52 
On occasion, suicidal students are also homicidal.  Cho killed himself 
after he had killed thirty-two others.53  Similarly, the Columbine shooters, 
Klebold and Harris, committed suicide following their rampage.54  But at 
other times—in the case of Luke Woodham, for example—one of the most 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See id. at 216 ("The connection between mental illness and violence is hotly 
disputed by many psychologists and psychiatrists, who emphasize that those who are 
mentally ill are no more likely to commit acts of violence than those who are not."). 
 50. See Gary Pavela, College Suicide:  A Law and Policy Perspective, Address at the 
Washington and Lee University School of Law Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 
Symposium:  Violence on Campus:  Students Who Are a Danger to Self or Others and 
Appropriate Institutional Responses (Nov. 9, 2009) (suggesting that harsh disciplinary or 
dismissal policies designed to deal with at-risk students may compromise the willingness of 
the community to bring troubled students to the attention of administrators and support 
staff). 
 51. See ROY, supra note 2, at 170 (explaining that labeling young people as 
"superpredators," a label coined by Princeton criminologist John J. Dilulio Jr. in 1995, may 
result in reactive and excessive measures to combat youth violence). 
 52. See DEWEY G. CORNELL, SCHOOL VIOLENCE:  FEAR VERSUS FACTS 11–13 (2006) 
(describing the ineffective and even counterproductive policies that have arisen out of fear of 
school violence) [hereinafter CORNELL]. 
 53. See ROY, supra note 2, at 231 ("It was the order of the slaughter, of course, that 
was so horrifying—the fact that he ended with suicide and didn’t begin with it, the fact that 
he was number 33 rather than number 1."). 
 54. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Terror in Littleton:  The Overview, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 
22, 1999, at A1 (stating that the two shooters were found dead, killed by self-inflicted 
gunshots to the head). 
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cold-hearted killers, who attacked a school in Pearl, Mississippi in 1997, 
killing two and injuring seven others55—students perpetrators have no 
intention of committing suicide.56  In fact, some appear to have a very 
strong sense of self preservation.57 
We need to be mindful of how potent imagery can be when we employ 
it to describe campus violence.  The poster for this symposium, for 
example, effective though it is, juxtaposes a gun pointed at potential victims 
with the anguished face of a student who is presumably contemplating 
suicide.58  Although the poster effectively captures the urgency of the 
situation, I am concerned about the implications of these visual signals.  
When we talk about this inflammatory subject, we must examine our own 
verbal and visual rhetoric with care. 
In the fall of 2005, I was the chair of the English department at 
Virginia Tech when Seung-Hui Cho’s behavior was brought to my 
attention.59  I reported our concerns about him to several units on campus 
(the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, counseling services, 
Student Affairs, and the Virginia Tech Police),60 and, in almost all cases, 
they did their best to respond.61  Some of those with whom I spoke about 
troubled students were particularly diligent—notably the campus police and 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Peter Langman, To Kill and To Die:  Suicide and School Shooters, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/keeping-kids-
safe/200908/kill-and-die-suicide-and-school-shooters (stating that Luke Woodham 
attempted to flee the scene after his rampage and, although he had been suicidal in the past, 
did not attempt to kill himself nor set himself up to be killed by police) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 56. See id. (explaining that not all rampage school shooters are suicidal during their 
attacks, noting that a significant percentage of the school shooters he studied made no effort 
to kill themselves or set themselves up to be killed by police). 
 57. See id. (finding that self-preservation is most common in psychopathic killers, 
likely because of their narcissistic tendencies). 
 58. See Washington and Lee University School of Law Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice Symposium:  Violence on Campus:  Students Who Are a Danger to Self or 
Others and Appropriate Institutional Responses (Nov. 6, 2009), http://law.wlu.edu/crsj/ 
page.asp?pageid=939 (including an image of the poster used to promote the Fall 2009 
symposium) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 59. See ROY, supra note 2, at 2–3 (explaining Roy’s role as chair of the English 
Department at Virginia Tech and meetings with Cho in the fall of 2005). 
 60. See id. at 31 ("On October 18, 2005, I alerted units that dealt with troubled 
students at Virginia Tech that we had a serious problem.  It was the first in a series of e-
mails I sent and phone calls I made about Seung."). 
 61. See id. at 32–56 (describing the units’ reaction to Cho in the fall of 2005).  Roy 
also devotes time to recounting Cho’s experience with the Cook Counseling Center (CCC) 
in late 2005.  Id. at 62–67. 
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Tom Brown in the Office of Student Life and Advocacy (mistakenly 
identified in the Panel Report authorized by Governor Kaine as the Dean of 
Students Office).62  Ultimately, however, as is pointed out in the Panel 
Report, Virginia Tech’s narrow interpretation of FERPA and issues related 
to student privacy hindered the response.63  The panelists’ conclusions point 
to vulnerabilities in the system:  "The system failed to provide needed 
support and services to Cho during a period in late 2005 and early 2006.  
The system failed for lack of resources, incorrect interpretations of privacy 
laws, and passivity.  Records of Cho’s minimal treatment at Virginia Tech’s 
Cook Counseling Center are missing."64 
Seung-Hui Cho sought counseling services on more than one 
occasion,65 and counseling was mandated by Special Justice Paul Barnett 
following a thirty-minute commitment hearing on December 14th, 2005.66  
But even though Cho requested one of the counselors I had recommended 
to him, he received, according to the Panel Report, "minimal treatment."67   
Until recently, Seung-Hui Cho’s file was missing from the Cook 
Counseling Center.68  In July 2009, Dr. Robert Miller, former director of 
the Counseling Center, disclosed that he had discovered Cho’s file in his 
home in July.69  He reports that he inadvertently removed it in 2006 when 
                                                                                                                 
 62. THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Appendix B:  Individuals Interviewed by Research 
Panel, in MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH B-1, B-2 (2007), available at 
http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/report/20_APPENDIX_B.pdf (identifying Tom 
Brown’s position incorrectly). 
 63. THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Chapter V:  Information Privacy Laws, in MASS 
SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 63, 65-67 (2007), available at http://www.vtreview 
panel.org/report/report/12_CHAPTER_V.pdf (noting that FERPA allows reporting of 
student records under certain circumstances). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See ROY, supra note 2, at 62 ("Cho had contacted the CCC not once but three 
times."). 
 66. See id. at 65 ("A little later that day, Special Justice Paul M, Barnett conducted a 
commitment hearing that lasted about thirty minutes . . . [He] ordered Cho to receive follow-
up treatment as an outpatient."). 
 67. THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Summary of Key Findings, in MASS SHOOTINGS AT 
VIRGINIA TECH 1, 2 (2007), available at http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/report/ 
07_SUMMARY.pdf ("Records of Cho’s minimal treatment at Virginia Tech’s Cook 
Counseling Center are missing."). 
 68. David Reiss  & Jim Nolan, Ex-Tech Official:  Cho’s Files Removed By Mistake, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 24, 2009, available at http://www2.times 
dispatch.com/news/ 2009/jul/24/tech24_20090723-222607-ar-36272/ (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 69. Id. 
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he stepped down from his position as director.70  The records do not reveal 
much about why it was that the meetings Cho did have with counselors 
were so brief.  But it is possible that the lack of treatment Seung-Hui Cho 
received was due in part to the policy in effect at the Cook Counseling 
Center at that time—one that permitted the center only to serve students 
who sought counseling voluntarily.71  Although this policy does not appear, 
by some accounts, to have been applied consistently, Dr. Chris Flynn, the 
person who replaced Dr. Miller as the director of the Cook Counseling 
Center, shed some light on it in an interview with the New York Times on 
April 20th, 2007.72  Dr. Flynn is quoted as saying that Cho had not broken 
any law, and that it was not the role of the mental health professionals to 
assess the safety of others.73  This demonstrates how hard it could be at 
Virginia Tech at that time to find a responsible party willing to intervene in 
the case of a troubled student.  It also raises a key question:  if mental 
health professionals were not there to assess the safety of others, who was?  
Because we did not have a trained threat assessment team in place at 
Virginia Tech,74 this role could fall to faculty and department chairs.75  It is 
easy to blame counseling services when a student attacks a campus.  But it 
is important in cases like this to understand the reality they face, too.  At 
Virginia Tech at the time of the shootings there were roughly 2,700 
students for every counselor.76  There are now 1,750 students to each 
counselor.77  In addition, there was no staff psychiatrist in the years before 
the tragedy even though we were a campus of some 26,000 students.78 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. See ROY, supra note 2, at 65 (quoting the staff psychiatrist at the CCC as he 
described the policy that students must seek counseling voluntarily as an obstacle in his 
attempts to treat Cho). 
 72. See Ian Urbina & Manny Fernandez, University Explains the Return of Troubled 
Student, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/04/20/us/20virginia.html?scp=4&sq=Chris%20Flynn%20Virginia%20Tech&st=cse 
("‘The university is not part of the mental health system nor the judiciary system, and we 
would not be the providers of mandatory counseling in this instance,’ Mr. Flynn said at a 
news conference.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 73. See id. (giving a fuller account of the role of the Cook Counseling Center). 
 74. See ROY, supra note 2, at 159 ("In 2005, there was no threat assessment team at 
Virginia Tech . . . ."). 
 75. See ROY, supra note 2, at 30–44 (explaining Roy’s role in dealing with Cho as 
Chair of the English department at Virginia Tech). 
 76. See Esposito, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Esposito, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 78. See ROY, supra note 2, at 159 ("In 2005, there was no threat assessment team at 
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In the spring of 2005, when, as I detail in the book, we had dealt with 
another very challenging student in English,79 I met with various units 
across campus to convey my deep concerns about our inability to respond 
effectively in such cases.80  Several faculty members met with 
representatives from Virginia Tech police, Student Affairs, the Cook 
Counseling Center, Judicial Affairs, and the Women’s Center to discuss the 
issue.81  Departments were being placed in untenable positions, particularly 
those where student work involved creativity and self expression.  It was 
risky to try to get long-term assistance for a troubled student at Virginia 
Tech because you may well find yourself having to choose between two 
evils.  If a student’s writing generated concern but he had not made explicit 
threats or violated Virginia Tech’s code of conduct, department chairs were 
advised to transfer the student into another class where it was hoped he 
would respond better to instruction.82  But this was not a viable option for 
me as chair on the two occasions where I felt that students were in need of 
intervention.  If you transferred the student, you simply relocated the risk;83  
if you did intervene, you could find yourself alone in a room with someone 
who needed far more help than you could provide.  This is what happened 
in Cho’s case.84 
The sense of responsibility teachers feel in cases like this can be 
onerous.  I would suggest that the situation is exacerbated for women and 
minorities because disturbed or enraged students who exhibit misanthropic 
                                                                                                                 
Virginia Tech and no staff psychiatrist."). 
 79. See id. at 155–66 (documenting Roy’s experiences with "Student A," which 
demonstrate the difficulty of scenarios at college campuses similar to that of Cho’s in fall 
2005). 
 80. See id. at 163 ("The university needed to be aware of the fact that departments and 
programs were in urgent need of assistance . . . Later that same year, a small group of 
concerned faculty from two creative arts programs met with representatives from various 
units on campus to discuss the issue."). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 41 (making it clear that Roy could not compel Cho to see a counselor, 
and was instead obliged to place him in an "equivalent academic experience" by transferring 
him to another class). 
 83. See id. at 158 (describing Roy’s concerns regarding removing "Student A" from 
creative writing class:  "[P]rotocol required that I . . . [transfer] him into another . . . [As] 
creative writing . . . triggered his most disturbing work, transferring him . . . was something I 
would not do"). 
 84. See id. at 44–56 (recounting Roy’s meetings with Cho during the fall 2005 
semester). 
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tendencies are sometimes misogynistic and/or racist.85  Meeting with Cho 
was, to say the least, challenging. 
The following passage from No Right to Remain Silent is from the 
chapter "A Boy Named Loser," a name Cho selected for himself in a sestina 
he wrote.86  The chapter details my meetings with him during the fall of 
2005: 
It’s not simply that Seung seems to be so depressed; it is his anger that 
troubles me, particularly when I am never sure how he will react to my 
suggestions that he seek counseling.  I am aware of the fact that, in some 
cultures, admitting you need to see a counselor can be viewed as 
weakness and can therefore be offensive, especially to young men.  But 
I keep suggesting this option because I am convinced that he needs 
help.87 
There are times when I feel that we may be getting somewhere, when he 
volunteers information, for example, or when he seems to be faintly 
amused by a joke or story I have told him.  But his problems seem so 
acute to me that it is almost impossible to tell for certain.   Still, I feel as 
though we are making some progress today.  He doesn’t turn away as he 
used to, but sometimes he gives me a look so full of pain that I am not 
sure what to do with it.88 
People are surprised to learn that some of us who knew Cho best have 
not been asked a single question about the specifics of what happened by 
the Virginia Tech administration.89  There is an assumption that there has 
been a thorough internal investigation,90 and indeed, in addition to the panel 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See id. at 157 (characterizing Student A’s work, which "contained philosophical 
assertions about the inferiority of women, disabled people, and African Americans, who 
were usually referred to pejoratively when they appeared").  
 86. See id. at 56 ("Seung gave me the fragment of his novel framed by two poems at 
the end of the semester[,] . . . the first of which was entitled ‘a boy named LOSER,’ and 
written in a complex, prescribed form known as a sestina.").  
 87. Id. at 49. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Lucinda Roy, Learning More from the Tragedy at Virginia Tech, RICHMOND 
TIMES-DISPATCH, May 31, 2009, available at http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2009/ 
may/31/roy531_20090529-211811-ar-41876/ ("At Virginia Tech, the upper administration 
has not, as far as I know, asked those of us who reported our concerns about Cho and other 
troubled students a single question about what happened.") (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 90. See Michael Williams, Lawsuit Can Help Get to Truth About Tech Massacre, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 14, 2010, available at http://www2.timesdispatch. 
com/news/2010/jan/14/mike14_20100113-222806-ar-19089/ (describing victims’ families’ 
impressions at the time of the settlement with the state) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  Lori Haas of Richmond stated "at the time of the 
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investigation, there have been internal investigations to address general 
issues related to campus violence.91  But the system currently in place 
discourages a focus on the specifics of Cho’s case because it raises the 
specter of liability.92  More than two years after the tragedy, there is still 
confusion about what can and what cannot be revealed.93 
Two families did not accept the settlement brokered by Governor Tim 
Kaine because, according to reports in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, they 
believe important questions about what happened have not been 
addressed.94  If you read the Panel Report with care, you see that there are 
indeed some surprising things omitted from it.  (Update:  The revisions 
made to the Panel Report in the November 2009 addendum have been 
helpful in shedding some light on what actually transpired; but, according 
to reports in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, many of the victims’ families 
still feel that key questions have not been addressed.)95  Colonel Massengill, 
chair of the panel, has admitted, for example, that Wendell Flinchum—
Virginia Tech’s chief of police and, in my opinion, a man of integrity—was 
never asked precisely what it was he conveyed to President Charles Steger 
on that fateful morning when, for two hours, the campus was not warned 
that there were two murdered students in a dorm room, the murder weapon 
was missing, there were as yet no viable suspects, and bloody footprints led 
from the room.96  Some families are appalled by the fact Dr. Robert Miller, 
the person who served as the director of the Cook Counseling Center in 
                                                                                                                 
settlement, it was suggested to the families that all the information about the case was 
out . . . .  ‘And most of the families made their decision to settle based on the information at 
that time.  And subsequent to settling, we find more and more information.’"  Id. 
 91. See generally Threat Assessment and Management, VIRGINIA TECH, 
http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu/index.html (outlining Virginia Tech’s process of 
preventing violence on campus) (last visited Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 92. See ROY, supra note 2, at 72 (explaining the university’s concerns about violating 
federal and state laws by making a student’s health and academic records public). 
 93. See Roy, supra note 89 (calling for an independent investigative panel in similar 
situations, in order to avoid this confusion and "examine the legal ramifications of full 
disclosure in an effort to allay fears about litigation and create an environment where open 
communication is encouraged"). 
 94. See Williams, supra note 90 (explaining that civil lawsuits brought by two 
victims’ families are about truth and accountability, and result in the provision of additional 
information about the shooting to the public).  
 95. Id. 
 96. See Roy, supra note 89 ("We still have no clarification about what Virginia Tech 
Police Chief Wendell Flinchum told President Steger on that fateful morning . . . Massengill, 
chair of the Commonwealth’s review panel, admitted to the Richmond Times-Dispatch in 
September 2008, no one on the panel asked Chief Flinchum that particular question."). 
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2005 when Seung-Hui Cho was brought to their attention, and who recently 
came across Cho’s medical records in his home, was never interviewed by 
the panelists.97  Some of those who served in the Policy Group—the group 
that made the decision not to close the campus after the first two 
homicides—were not interviewed either.98  Someone high up in the 
administration told me candidly, not long ago, that he wished every 
member of the Policy Group had been asked to make a deposition soon 
after the tragedy.  He believed that, had this been done, some of the issues 
which urgently needed to be addressed would have been.  I have to agree.99  
In fact, I would also suggest that a session somewhat similar to the M & M 
(Mortality and Morbidity) conferences conducted in the medical profession 
would have been very helpful, especially because we did not know at that 
time whether or not Cho acted alone.100  I cannot emphasize this last point 
enough.  Therefore, it is vital that as much information as possible be 
gathered about the shooter and his history during the initial investigation.  If 
people are afraid to talk about what they know, the entire campus becomes 
vulnerable.  This is why I found the administration’s emphasis on Seung-
Hui Cho’s privacy after the shootings even more disturbing than the 
emphasis placed on it while he was alive.101 
After a school shooting, you do not know whether or not another 
attack will ensue. Therefore, you urgently need to discover what is known 
about the perpetrator(s).  You also need to understand how an institution 
has responded to the crisis because the same people will be at the helm 
should another crisis occur.  Currently, however, we hastily convene panels 
following school shootings and ask them to conduct investigations that can 
be tainted by conflicts of interest.102  As I wrote in a commentary published 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See VIRGINIA TECH PANEL REPORT, supra note 62, at B-2 (listing the Virginia Tech 
faculty members interviewed by the panel; Dr. Miller is not named). 
 98. See id. (noting the list of Virginia Tech faculty members interviewed by the panel; 
not all members of the Policy Group are named). 
 99. See ROY, supra note 2, at 298 ("The only extended narrative provided by the 
Policy Group about . . . April 16 was the written statement read by David 
Ford . . . [U]niversity administration determined who would represent it and managed the 
documentation sent to the panel . . . [K]ey voices were sometimes missing."). 
 100. See id. at 80 ("Early Monday morning, however, I realized why something still 
bothered me.  Classes were due to begin that day, but no one was yet 100 percent sure that 
Seung-Hui Cho had acted alone.  The first two homicides had not been definitely connected 
with the later killings."). 
 101. See id. at 141 ("By the summer of 2007, . . . for me at least, it was the high priority 
placed on Cho’s privacy by the administration that caused the greatest confusion."). 
 102. See Roy, supra note 89 (describing how a conflict of interest develops in an attack 
on a university campus). 
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in May 2009 in the Richmond Times-Dispatch,103 we should consider an 
alternative approach: 
After attacks on schools, an independent investigative panel, chaired by 
someone unaffiliated with the school or with the state, would be 
appointed by the U.S. Department of Education.  This panel would be 
charged not only with investigating the tragedy, but also with 
determining whether or not those in leadership positions would remain 
in place during the investigation, and how best to support the 
administration if it is asked to remain.  [The panel] would examine the 
legal ramifications of full disclosure in an effort to allay fears about 
litigation and create an environment where open communication is 
encouraged.  The existence of a federally appointed panel would allow 
us to view these attacks as a national disaster rather than a regional 
anomaly.  Information would be accumulated and shared more readily, 
and a coordinated, holistic response would be more likely to occur.104 
If the attack is on a university campus and there is university counsel, 
especially if counsel were present when decisions related to the tragedy 
were being made, as was the case at Virginia Tech, conflict of interest 
would be addressed.  During the investigative process, those same 
attorneys would not be asked to serve in their normal capacity as 
advisors to the entire campus.105  
Columbine preceded Virginia Tech by eight years,106 and the 
Valentine’s Day attack at Northern Illinois followed ten months after the 
Tech tragedy.107  There have been numerous incidents at other times, 
including a rash of shootings in the 1990s108 and a September 2009 attack 
on a school bus in Mississippi by a fourteen-year-old wielding a .380 
caliber semi-automatic handgun—an attack foiled by football star Kaleb 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Editorial, Eight Years After Columbine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/17/opinion/17tue1.html (urging stronger controls over 
the weapons used in these school shootings) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 107. See Steven Grey, How the NIU Massacre Happened, TIME, Feb. 16, 2008, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1714069,00.html ("It had been 
a week full of shootings on a number of high school campuses but the deadly six-minute 
long incident at NIU was by far the most reminiscent of last year’s horrendous Virginia Tech 
massacre where a lone gunman killed 32 people before committing suicide.") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 108. See Randy Borum et al., What Can Be Done About School Shootings? A Review of 
the Evidence, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 27, 27 (2010) ("A series of high-profile school 
shootings in the 1990s focused America’s attention on the problem of school violence."). 
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Eulls, who tackled the girl and averted a tragedy.109  We know there are 
homicidal students in our schools and colleges, but the prevailing culture 
and the assumptions we have about students make this hard to 
acknowledge.110  In fact, I would suggest that the educational environment 
is particularly ill-equipped to deal with students who may be homicidal.  
We expect students to comply with codes of conduct, to understand why it 
would be wrong to attack others.  When they do not, the first reaction can 
be one of disbelief.  If we are not careful, because we are overwhelmed, the 
second reaction is one of denial and paralysis.  In fact, denial on the part of 
institutions and the families of student shooters is not uncommon.111  Kip 
Kinkel, for example, the student who carried out an attack on Thurston 
High School in Oregon seventeen hours after he had murdered his parents, 
had been obsessed with bombs and guns for years prior to his attacks on his 
home and school.112 
As I suggested earlier, the law can silence meaningful dialogue.  Our 
fear of litigation stymies our response to troubled students.113  I still hear 
from teachers around the country who tell me they are terrified of students 
in their classes.114  Some have tried to bring their concerns to the attention 
of administrators and are told they are exaggerating the situation; others are 
heard by those to whom they appeal, but are told nothing can be done 
unless an overt threat has been made.115  Sometimes there are gender or 
racial issues at work to further complicate the situation.  David Cariens, Jr., 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See Chris Lawlor, Recruit’s Timely Tackle Averts Tragedy, ESPN, Sept. 4, 2009, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/recruiting/football/news/story?id=4443951 (discussing how 
Eulls disarmed the attacker and helped the other children on the bus escape) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 110. See ROY, supra note 2, at 167–90 (expounding on this dilemma in her chapter 
entitled Teachers and Students). 
 111. See Natalia Quirk, Reasons Behind School Shootings Run Deep, THE HEIGHTS, 
Mar. 26, 2001, available at http://www.bcheights.com/2.6178/reasons-behind-school-
shootings-run-deep-1.928623?pagereq=1 ("In response to the question of what makes some 
children capable of arming themselves and following through, Panasevich sees it as purely 
psychiatric.  There are warning signs, she says, but parents and teachers are often in denial.  
They don’t want therapy; they just want the problems to go away.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 112. See Roy, supra note 2, at 215 ("Although Kinkel’s obsession with guns and 
explosives had worried his parents for years, they were in denial about the extent of his 
illness . . . ."). 
 113. See id. at 89 ("We would recognize that a fear of litigation is silencing us, even 
though for the sake of our students, it’s imperative that we speak."). 
 114. See id. at 248–50 (describing Roy’s correspondence with teachers and professors 
following her prominent interviews about the shooting). 
 115. See id. and accompanying text. 
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in his book A Question of Accountabilty:  The Murder of Angela Dales, 116 
describes the response to an African graduate student at the Appalachian 
School of Law: 
According to court documents filed in Wise County, Virginia, three 
female staff members filed a complaint with school officials against 
Odighiwuza, expressing fear for their safety as well as the safety of 
others at the school.  These court documents also assert that the 
complaint was aired at a school administration meeting . . . .  The same 
documents also assert that [one administrator] responded to the 
complaint by saying "You women and your hormones and your 
intuition . . . there is nothing for you to be afraid of . . . it will be 
okay."117 
A little later, on January 16th, 2002, Odighiwuza killed three people 
and wounded three others.118 
Counselor and law enforcement personnel are often scapegoats.119  
Their role is to prevent troubled students from perpetrating attacks.120  But 
often these units are severely understaffed; nor are support services 
necessarily part of key decision-making teams on campuses—places where 
the right terminal degrees are passports to power.121  Campus 
administrators, faculty, and staff have to manage larger and larger cities of 
youth where inhabitants are on (or off) medication and at risk for substance 
abuse and depression.122  Our expectations about what counselors and law 
enforcement personnel should accomplish are therefore totally 
unrealistic.123  Teachers are being asked to assume the roles of untrained 
interventionists.124 
                                                                                                                 
 116. DAVID CARIENS, A QUESTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY:  THE MURDER OF ANGELA 
DALES (2008). 
 117. Id. at 37. 
 118. See id. at 13 ("The tragedy at the Appalachian School of Law on January 16, 2002, 
far exceeds the death of three decent, innocent people and the wounding of three others."). 
 119. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN ET AL., RAMPAGE:  THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF SCHOOL 
SHOOTINGS 77 (2004) (stating that oftentimes after a school shooting, counselors and other 
authority figures are unfairly blamed for not preventing the violence) [hereinafter NEWMAN]. 
 120. See id. at 104 (discussing the role that school counselors should take in relation to 
preventing violent attacks). 
 121. See id. at 110 (discussing that counselors do not have the time or resources to 
properly monitor potentially dangerous students). 
 122. See ROY, supra note 2, at 8 (describing the difficult choice that teachers, 
administrators, and faculty in large school systems face in choosing whether to approach a 
potentially dangerous student). 
 123. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 107–08 (discussing school counselors as 
having too many competing responsibilities to effectively monitor potentially violent 
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In a chapter devoted to teachers and students in No Right To Remain 
Silent, I attempted to show how ludicrous this is by including an imagined 
conversation between two neighbors:  an older man, Bill, and a young 
female teacher, Shareeza.125  Shareeza receives a call from Bill, who tells 
her he has a job for her.126  He says there is a dangerous juvenile living in 
the building and the neighbors have decided that Shareeza, being a teacher, 
should intervene.127  Armed with "a number two pencil and a college-ruled 
writing pad" (so that she can take notes), Shareeza rushes off to save the 
day, buoyed by the fact that, the previous month, "she attended a workshop 
entitled ‘Dealing with Troubled Students Who May Wish to Kill You.’"128  
It lasted an entire morning; she feels prepared.129 
I have heard from teachers who tell me that students in their classes 
are a danger to themselves and others when they are off their meds—that 
they dread entering the classroom because the student with whom they are 
working is uncontrollable.130  But many of these urgent voices belong to 
women, and we do not have a good track record of listening to women in 
education, even though female voices should be in the majority to 
accurately reflect the composition of the teaching profession.131 
Confining our examination of this problem to the role played by 
educational institutions fails to take into account other key factors.132  It is 
true that some of the main obstacles to successful intervention are located in 
the institutional sphere (in Cho’s case the university and middle and high 
                                                                                                                 
students). 
 124. See id. at 105 (discussing teachers’ resentment at being asked to act as counselors, 
when they are not qualified to solve students’ social and serious behavioral problems). 
 125. See ROY, supra note 2, at 185–87 (explaining a hypothetical situation between a 
young teacher, Shareeza, and a neighbor, Bill). 
 126. Id. at 185. 
 127. Id. at 186. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 187. 
 130. See id. at 6 ("There are teachers fearful that a particular child will be off his meds 
today, and that, as a result, he will be uncontrollable.").   
 131. See Female Science Professor, Why ‘Female’ Science Professor?, THE CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC., June 15, 2010 (discussing the discrimination of women in the field of 
education); see also National Institute for Education Information Profiles of Teachers in the 
U.S. 2005, http://www.ncei.com/POT05PRESSREL3.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2010) (stating 
that eighty-two percent of all public school teachers were female in 2005) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 132. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 278 (discussing the need for considering 
school organization, social capital, and the culture surrounding adolescents to fully 
understand and prevent school violence). 
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schools).133  But the relational sphere (functioning both as historical archive 
of a child’s behavior and main support mechanism), the individual sphere 
(Cho himself, his teachers, fellow students, etc.), and the cultural sphere (a 
place where key assumptions about students, teachers, violence, education, 
etc., hold sway) also play pivotal roles.134   It is very difficult for a 
successful response to occur in the case of severely disturbed/homicidal 
students unless these spheres intersect and crucial information is shared.135  
Yet most of the discussion around campus violence tends to focus on the 
first sphere, that of the institution.136  In truth, as we know, successful 
intervention is just as dependent upon the actions of those in the other, 
intersecting spheres.  In Cho’s case, as is detailed in the section on his early 
years in the Panel Report, information critical to our understanding of his 
condition was not conveyed to Virginia Tech by Cho, his family, or his 
schools.137  We did not discover he suffered from selective mutism—a 
condition that renders a person unable to speak in certain social situations—
until after the tragedy.138  Virginia Tech was not told that Cho had 
fantasized about school shootings in middle school, following the attack on 
Columbine, or that he had been referred for treatment and placed on 
medication.139  According to the Panel Report, Cho had declined to take 
medication when he reached the age of eighteen, something he had the legal 
right to do.140 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See ROY, supra note 2, at 30 ("It could be hell trying to get help for a troubled 
student a Virginia Tech."). 
 134. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 278 (discussing the importance of 
analyzing several different factors when predicting and preventing school violence). 
 135. See id. (discussing the importance of compiling information from several spheres 
in dealing with troubled students). 
 136. See ROY, supra note 2, at 30 (describing that there are institutional problems as 
well as other problems that should be carefully studied in the case of a school shooter). 
 137. THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Chapter IV:  Life and Mental History of Cho, in 
MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 31, 33 (2007), available at http://www.vtreviewpanel. 
org/report/report/07_SUMMARY.pdf ("Records of Cho’s minimal treatment at Virginia 
Tech’s Cook Counseling Center are missing."). 
 138. See ROY, supra note 2, at 38 ("Neither Cho nor his high school revealed that he 
had been receiving special education services as an emotionally disabled student, so no one 
at the university ever became aware of these pre-existing conditions.").  "During the 
admissions process, no one at Virginia Tech had been notified by Seung, his parents, or his 
high school that he suffered from selective mutism."  Id. at 36.  
 139. See id. and accompanying text. 
 140. See id. at 37 ("Mr. and Mrs. Cho were not happy that their son chose to 
discontinue treatment, but he was turning 18 the following month and legally he could make 
that decision."). 
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One of the findings of the Panel Report following the Virginia Tech 
tragedy was that the university’s narrow interpretation of laws pertaining to 
student privacy—particularly the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA)—meant that important information was not routinely shared.141  I 
still hear from teachers around the country who tell me how impossible it is 
to share information across the often rigidly hierarchical architecture 
existing in K–12 and higher education.142  In reality, administrators are 
frequently unaware of the shortcomings of their own institutions.143  If we 
conducted a national survey to determine how many teachers have 
encountered obstacles to obtaining help for troubled students, I think the 
results would be eye opening.144 
As I suggest in No Right to Remain Silent, teachers and parents can be 
ill-equipped to deal with deeply troubled youth, and completely 
overwhelmed if the child is engaged in what appears to be homicidal 
ideation.145  Teachers are trained to believe that we can reach any student if 
we try hard enough; we work hard to establish the classroom as a site of 
mutual respect and trust.146  Our classrooms are meant to function as 
learning sanctuaries.147  Students are expected to play by the rules.148 
The premise of this symposium is that we can develop strategies 
enabling us to identify threats to campus safety and respond more 
appropriately to them.149  I believe this to be true.  But I also believe we will 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See id. at 63–70 (discussing federal FERPA and HIPAA information privacy laws 
governing the sharing of information about students in public universities). 
 142. See id. at 171 (describing the confusion that schools face in dealing with the 
release of students’ personal information and school records).  Roy also describes the 
frustration she and professors felt at Virginia Tech that they could not get a student into 
counseling unless he made an explicit threat.  Id. at 67. 
 143. See id. at 179 (discussing the difficulty for administrators to truly understand 
challenges teachers face in the classroom on a daily basis). 
 144. See id. at 179–83 (detailing the author’s personal teaching experience and 
interactions with administration and support units while trying to help troubled students). 
 145. See id. at 8 (discussing that oftentimes parents, teachers, and other administrators 
are not prepared to deal with troubled students who may have violent intentions). 
 146. See id. at 167 (describing the "Ideal Teacher"). 
 147. See id. ("It is a matter of inspired teaching on the part of the teacher, and receptive 
learning on the part of the student."). 
 148. See id. at 9 ("Our education system is premised on the belief that students are 
willing to abide by the rules we establish and that they will seek help when they need it."). 
 149. See Washington and Lee University School of Law Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice Symposium:  Violence on Campus:  Students Who are a Danger to Self or 
Others and Appropriate Institutional Responses, http://law.wlu.edu/crsj/page.asp?pageid 
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fail unless we debunk the myths and misconceptions surrounding the issue 
of violence on campus. 
I have taught for more than thirty years on three different continents.150  
I have worked with thousands of students from the ages of six to ninety.151  
With age and experience comes freedom.  I am too old to care if I offend 
people.  I have endured such things as a robbery in the dead of night by 
men who entered my home with machetes—an effective way to learn how 
not to be intimidated.152  I was trained as a teacher in England and came to 
college teaching with experience teaching high-school and middle-school 
students.153  I therefore understand how important it is that faculty have 
opportunities to learn how to teach and how to relate to students.154  A 
thorough knowledge of one’s own field should not be the only qualification 
for faculty who teach.155 
In K–12, one of the most difficult challenges we face is how to deal 
with the reality of bullying and its link to attacks.156  We know that bullying 
goes on in our schools, particularly if students are perceived to be 
different.157  Yet we often expect children to deal with this on their own. 158  
We also underestimate how seductive violence can be for young people.159  
As I was conducting research for my book, one of the most chilling 
                                                                                                                 
=939 (last visited Sept. 5, 2010) (setting forth the goals of the symposium) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 150. See Biological Info for Lucinda Roy, http://www.lucindaroy.net/bio (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2010) (giving the personal and professional biography of author Lucinda Roy) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See ROY, supra note 2, at 42 (describing the author’s experience of being robbed 
by intruders armed with machetes while living in Sierra Leone). 
 153. See Biographical Info for Lucinda Roy, supra note 153 (discussing the author’s 
professional career). 
 154. See ROY, supra note 2, at 129 (emphasizing the importance of having faculty in 
leadership positions who have experience working with students and in the classroom). 
 155. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 105 (discussing that teachers need to not 
only be prepared to teach their assigned subject but also to teach and relate to the students 
themselves). 
 156. See id. at 292 (describing bullying as a problem that affects all schools and has led 
in some cases to situations of violence). 
 157. See id. (explaining the frequency and severity of bullying in U.S. schools). 
 158. See id. at 293 ("Efforts to focus on changing either the bullies or the victims are 
unlikely to be effective, because they leave the underlying power dynamics largely 
unchanged."). 
 159. See id. at 70 (discussing the great impact violent media has on adolescent 
children). 
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accounts I read was written by Bill Dedman for the Chicago Sun-Times.160  
He describes what happened when student Evan Ramsey decided to shoot 
his fellow students and his principal: 
"I told everyone what I was going to do," said Evan Ramsey, 16, who 
killed his principal and a student in remote Bethel, Alaska, in 1997.  He 
told so many students about his hit list that his friends crowded the 
library balcony to watch.  One boy brought a camera.  "You’re not 
supposed to be up here," one girl told another.  "You’re on the list."161 
Most college and university attacks appear to have been planned and 
executed by a single shooter.162  But these K–12 school shooters tell us we 
would be foolish to assume in the future that this will be the case.  Nor 
should we assume that terrorists are unaware of the havoc they could wreak 
should they decide to attack our campuses.  Although we should not 
overreact to the potential threat, we must be mindful of the fact that it is 
much easier for older students and adults to obtain lethal weapons like 
semi-automatic weapons, chemical weapons, and bombs.163  Because of 
this, it is essential that we reexamine gun laws in Virginia and elsewhere, 
and that, working collaboratively across our differences, we reintroduce 
sanity into our gun legislation.164 
It is easy to talk about what must be done; it is very hard to do it.  As I 
said before, if our strategy is to be effective, we must debunk some 
prevailing myths about education.165  I have made a list of twelve common 
myths that function as obstacles to successful intervention.  Some I have 
mentioned earlier; others I explore in more detail in No Right to Remain 
Silent: 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See Bill Dedman, Deadly Lessons:  School Shooters Tell Why, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Oct. 15, 2000, at 4 (discussing that school shooters often tell people of their violent plans 
before the shooting). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 56 (explaining that most school shooters 
act alone). 
 163. See ROY, supra note 2, at 221 (discussing the ease with which an adult can gain 
access to any number of dangerous weapons). 
 164. See id. at 219 ("If communities cannot be rid of guns, we need to offer a far greater 
degree of protection to faculty, staff, and students.").  Roy discusses Virginia gun laws in 
particular because they had the most effect on Cho’s access to firearms.  Id. at 221. 
 165. See id. at 3 (discussing the institutional difficulties and obstacles that came to light 
during and after the Virginia Tech shooting). 
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1. Students who are a danger to themselves or others are easily 
identifiable166 
2. Educational institutions and their administrators, support 
personnel, faculty and staff, even though they may lack 
resources and training, are well prepared to deal with potential 
threats to the campus167 
3. Violent writing is a rarity on school campuses168  
4. Threat assessment teams know how to interpret violent 
writing169 
5. Cultural preoccupations with violence as performance and the 
yearning for media attention rarely influence young people170 
6. When a troubled or severely disturbed student is identified, 
mental health and law enforcement personnel have the 
resources and authority to respond appropriately171 
7. After an attack on a campus, information about exactly what 
went wrong is readily shared172    
8. There are rarely negative consequences for those who 
intervene173 
9. Mental illness, suicidal thoughts, and severe depression among 
students are rare174 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See id. at 35 (describing the difficulty in differentiating at-risk students from 
students who are a serious danger to themselves or others). 
 167. See id. at 140 ("Students arrive on campus with differing needs, and many 
universities are not ready to meet them."). 
 168. See id. at 198 (discussing the prevalence of violence in contemporary student and 
professional writing). 
 169. See id. at 159 (stating that in 2005, there was neither a threat assessment team at 
Virginia Tech nor members of the administration that knew how to interpret and evaluate 
violent writing). 
 170. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 70 ("Exposure to media violence is 
consistently associated with a variety of antisocial behaviors, from trivial violence against 
toys to serious criminal violence."). 
 171. See ROY, supra note 2, at 63 (explaining that Seung-Hui Cho tried to seek out 
counseling services at Virginia Tech, but was never diagnosed for reasons that have yet to be 
determined); see also id. at 615 ("But the University lacked the mechanisms needed to react 
more appropriately to what became an urgent and distressing situation."). 
 172. See id. at 62–85 (describing the lack of information within the Virginia Tech 
community following the shooting there). 
 173. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 291–92 (discussing the fear associated 
with threat interception and intervention). 
 174. See The Am. Coll. Health Ass’n, American College Health Association National 
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10. Open communication is encouraged on our campuses175 
11. All young people can control themselves around weapons, 
drugs and alcohol176  
12. Cross-generational communication occurs frequently, and 
family members often speak to each other about things of 
significance177 
In fact, students who are a danger to themselves or others are not 
necessarily easy to identify at all.178  In the larger public institutions, one-
on-one interaction with faculty and staff can be relatively unusual.179  I have 
heard from sophomores and juniors at Virginia Tech and elsewhere who 
have yet to be identified by name in class because their classes are so 
large.180  Even when they are noticed, these students do not necessarily wish 
to be identified, and some of the most severely troubled may not recognize 
the extent of their own illness.181 
Even though one of the first indicators of suicidal or homicidal 
ideation is often found in student writing, the interpretation of creative 
writing in particular is extraordinarily difficult.182  As Stephen King has 
pointed out in interviews, it is quite possible he would have been deemed a 
                                                                                                                 
College Health Assessment Spring 2006 Reference Group Data Report, 55 J. OF AM. C. 
HEALTH, 193, 205 (2007) (naming depression as number four in the top ten reported health 
problems students experienced in the past school year).  
 175. See ROY, supra note 2, at 140 (explaining that internal communication at Virginia 
Tech has become more difficult and the administration ignores voices that do not conform to 
its official view). 
 176. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 70–71 (explaining that susceptibility to 
violence and substance abuse is different in every child and some children have less control 
over their actions when exposed to dangerous substances). 
 177. See id. at 280–81 (discussing the lack of communication between adolescents and 
their parents). 
 178. See Roy, supra note 2, at 35 (describing the difficulty in differentiating at risk 
students from students who are a serious danger to themselves or others). 
 179. See id. at 278–79 (discussing the impracticability of a large institution like 
Virginia Tech being able to provide stable adult figures in students’ lives). 
 180. See id. at 65 (explaining that Seung-Hui Cho came to Virginia Tech, to a large 
campus of twenty-six thousand students, where he became lost in the crowd and bureaucracy 
of the school). 
 181. See id. at 191 (describing that education at large institutions can limit the amount 
of faculty to student interaction and the amount of in-class participation by students). 
 182. See id. at 143 ("But it proved difficult to determine what was ‘potentially 
dangerous,’ especially if the main evidence to support that claim was a student’s own poetry, 
fiction, or creative nonfiction."). 
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threat were he in school today.183  King has a special insight into student 
shootings in part because student shooter Barry Loukaitis is said to have 
modeled his attack on episodes of King’s novel, Rage.184 
There is little doubt that what students write can sometimes reveal a lot 
about them and that, in some cases, what they read can influence their 
behavior.185  But writing about violence is not to be easily equated with a 
yearning to actually commit acts of violence.186  In the wake of tragedy, 
however, media coverage often conflates the two. I devote a chapter to 
writers and writing in No Right to Remain Silent because I believe that 
student writing and self-expression will emerge as one of the most 
contentious issues surrounding threat assessment.187   If we attempt to 
legislate against violent writing by students, we will open up a can of 
worms; on the other hand, if we do not warn students that writing 
containing violence could be subject to review and even to harsh penalties, 
we risk injuring the innocent and the creative.188  Already in some states 
and school districts teachers are required to report violent writing, whether 
or not they think it is indicative of a student’s predilection for violence; in 
some places, teachers are arming themselves so that they can respond in 
kind to a shooter.189  We have zero tolerance policies running amuck in 
schools, policies that often defy common sense and result in absurd 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See Stephen King, On Predicting Violence, ENT. WKLY., Apr. 23, 2007 ("Certainly 
in this sensitized day and age, my own college writing—including a short story called ‘Cain 
Rose Up’ and the novel RAGE—would have raised red flags, and I’m certain someone 
would have tabbed me as mentally ill because of them."). 
 184. See Stephen King, Keynote Address at the Vermont Educational Media 
Association Annual Meeting:  The Bogeyboys (May 26, 1999) (transcript available at 
http://www.horrorking.com/interview7.html/) (discussing his decision to take Rage off the 
shelves of bookstores because of its alleged inspiration to a school shooter) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 185. See ROY, supra note 2, at 198–99 (discussing the revealing nature of violent 
students’ writing and choice of reading material).  
 186. See id. at 203 ("Fortunately, most of what the writing teachers receive, even when 
it contains explicit violence, is not a prelude to actual violence."). 
 187. See id. at 201–03 (discussing writers and writing in relation to violent thoughts and 
behavior). 
 188. See id. at 155–64 (detailing a story about ‘Student A’ that discusses both the 
positive and negative consequences of reporting violent writing to administration and law 
enforcement officials). 
 189. Nancy Rappaport & James G. Barrett, Under the Gun:  Threat Assessment in 
Schools, 11 VIRTUAL MENTOR:  AM. MED. ASS’N J. OF ETHICS 149, 149 (2009) ("For 
example, one school district in Texas certified its teachers to carry weapons in the classroom 
and sanctioned them to respond to a threat with deadly force if necessary."). 
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penalties.190  Take, for example, the case of the child in Arkansas who was 
suspended for pointing a chicken finger at a teacher.191  Overreaction can be 
as ineffective as under-reaction.192 
I am increasingly convinced that it is the performance aspect of violent 
attacks on schools which is particularly seductive to some young 
perpetrators.193  Dr. Katherine S. Newman and her graduate students have 
touched on this in their book Rampage:  The Social Roots of School 
Shootings.194   In general, however, there has been relatively little 
investigation into the school attack as media spectacle.195  It is clear that, in 
some cases at least, the fact that an attack on a school will result in a 
significant media response is a large part of the planning process.196  Some 
of these student perpetrators are so thirsty for fame they are prepared to kill 
and to die to obtain it.197   Society’s obsession with serial killers and mass 
murderers, our need to include ever more graphic depictions of horror and 
mutilation in our TV series, our movies, our books, and our video games 
testify to the fascination society has for violence.198  In his controversial 
book entitled On Killing:  The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in 
War and Society, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman suggests that violence has 
replaced sex as the most popular form of pornography.199  Some 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 285 ("In general, these policies require 
schools to follow formalized disciplinary procedures after any threat of violence and leave 
administrators with little discretion to separate serious offenders from casual jokers."). 
 191. See id. at 285 ("In Jonesboro, a five-year-old child pointed a chicken finger at 
another child and said, ‘Bang, bang, you’re dead.’ He was suspended and his parents were 
summoned to a meeting at the school."). 
 192. See id. (discussing how zero tolerance policies can be counterproductive).  
 193. See id. at 70 ("Exposure to violent media has increased dramatically among our 
youth over the last decade, pushing media influence forward as a prime explanation for the 
string of school shootings."). 
 194. See id. (describing the influence of violent media on adolescents who are ill-
equipped to differentiate between fiction and reality). 
 195. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 70 (explaining that there is little evidence 
on the effects of violent media on adolescents over time). 
 196. See id. at 72 (suggesting that media coverage and attention may impact an 
adolescent’s decision to commit a school shooting). 
 197. See ROY, supra note 2, at 89 (suggesting that Seung-Hui Cho sending a 
multimedia package to NBC shows that he wanted to attract media attention, was aware of 
the power he held, and knew his story would appeal to other troubled adolescents).  Cho 
wanted to make a name for himself and he knew the massacre at Virginia Tech would do 
just that.   Id. at 116. 
 198. See id. at 70 (describing the American culture as inundated with violent and 
bloodthirsty images). 
 199. See DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING:  THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO 
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psychologists have gone so far as to suggest that subjecting children to 
excessive violence is a form of child abuse.200  It is not possible, therefore, 
to look at student shooters in isolation.201  They are a product of their 
environment; the culture helps shape their attitudes.202 
In the case of a student who appears to be a potential threat, things are 
even more challenging than they are if one suspects the student is 
suicidal.203  First—a point that is often ignored—if you report your 
suspicion that a student could be a threat, that same student is likely to 
discover you have reported him.204  If he does so—assuming you are right 
in thinking he could be disturbed or enraged—you could be placing 
yourself and others at significant personal risk.205  Perhaps your reporting of 
the student will be the last straw, sending him over the edge.206  Second, 
your suspicions may be ill founded.207  Teachers who try to intervene run 
the risk of being tied up in litigation for years, accused of persecuting a 
student, destroying his self-esteem.208  If the troubled student is a minority, 
majority faculty risk being accused of racism.209  It is quite possible that the 
student will tell you the essay he wrote in which he dismembered toddlers 
                                                                                                                 
KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY 250 (2006) (claiming that the violence of the modern day media 
is very similar to military desensitizing techniques to increase firing and violence in war).  
 200. See George W. Holden, Differentiating Exposure to Violence and Child Abuse, in 
WORKSHOP ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE CURRENT STATUS, GAP, AND RESEARCH 
PRIORITIES 2, http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/research/pubs/cev-final-report.doc (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2010) ("While not all exposures lead to negative outcomes, children’s exposure to 
violence has been associated with a range of behavior problems.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 201. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 58–73 (discussing the culture of violence 
and bullying that can lead to school violence). 
 202. See id. and accompanying text. 
 203. See ROY, supra note 2, at 216 (stating that a history of mental illness, a 
preoccupation with suicide, and a fascination with violence can be indicators that correlate 
with a student contemplating violence). 
 204. See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 174 (explaining that oftentimes a troubled 
student finds out who reported their violent behavior). 
 205. See id. at 174 ("Merely taking action to stem an incident could ‘finger’ the 
speaker."). 
 206. See id. at 257 (explaining that a teacher who was concerned by a student’s violent 
writings did not turn the students’ writings in to the administration because she was afraid 
the student might have hurt himself). 
 207. See ROY, supra note 2, at 174 (explaining the nuances of threat assessment and the 
high possibility of error in categorically identifying a student as a threat). 
 208. See id. at 6 (discussing teachers’ reluctance to intervene in a violent students’ life). 
 209. See id. at 263−69 (discussing the impact of race on the Virginia Tech shooting and 
other contemporary school violence issues). 
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is satirical—in the manner of Jonathan Swift’s "A Modest Proposal."210  
Ninety-nine times out of a hundred, it is.  When Seung-Hui Cho wrote his 
angry poem about his teacher and classmates in creative writing, he 
insisted, at some length, that it was satirical.211  It was not by any means the 
most graphic or the angriest poem I have read from a student, but what 
concerned some of us was the marked difference between who he was on 
the page and who he was in person.212  But it took hours and hours of time 
to determine this, and it was a dangerous thing to attempt.213 
So what can we do to change the culture and make it more responsive 
to students who may be a danger to others?  Here are ten things I believe 
could help us address some of the challenges we face: 
1. Learn from what happened previously through careful analysis, 
investigation, and open dialogue 
2. Set up federally-appointed, independent investigative panels 
whenever an attack on a school occurs so that conflicts of 
interest can be avoided and open communication encouraged 
3. Establish a protocol similar to M & M conferences in the 
medical field to enable open, cross-disciplinary dialogue in the 
wake of a tragedy 
4. Institute effective safe harbor provisions for teachers so they 
will not be reluctant to report their concerns  
5. Train those on threat assessment teams to evaluate student 
writing; include experienced, respected teachers on these teams   
6. Institute and fund effective teacher-training programs for 
faculty  
7. Hire administrators with demonstrated teaching excellence, a 
rapport with students, and training in risk management 
8. Reexamine gun laws with the goal of preventing children and 
the mentally ill from obtaining lethal weapons 
9. Provide assistance to families who are dealing with troubled 
students before a crisis occurs 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See id. at 42 (stating that Seung-Hui Cho compared one of his poems as satirical in 
the same vein as Jonathan Swift’s "A Modest Proposal"). 
 211. See id. and accompanying text. 
 212. See id. at 30 (explaining the author’s reaction to Seung-Hui Cho’s poem). 
 213. See id. at 31 (explaining the extensive procedures the author took in analyzing 
Seung-Hui Cho’s poem). 
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10. Increase funding for counseling services, mental health and law 
enforcement214 
If all of these things had been in place at the time of the Virginia Tech 
shootings, would the tragedy have been prevented?   It is impossible to say 
for certain.  But we know what we risk if we do not make a concerted effort 
to improve the current situation. 
For some of us in this terrible fraternity of schools where attacks by 
students have occurred, homicidal students are not a theoretical possibility, 
they are a phenomenon we know only too well.215  The perspectives of 
those close to a tragedy like this are important because, just as is the case 
with war, there are things only those on the ground can know.216 
At the end of a commentary for the Richmond Times-Dispatch, I wrote 
the following: 
As parents and as educators we cannot be afraid of bullies, even when 
they carry arms, even when they enter our offices, as Seung-Hui Cho did 
mine, and assure us it’s okay to remain silent because his poem isn’t 
angry at all—just satirical.   
Our children are waiting for us to speak.  Our silence is killing them.217 
As I have said on a number of occasions at gatherings like this, I have 
a dream and my dream is this:  That one day, society will devote as much 
energy and resources to protecting its young as it does to protecting its 
money.  When this happens, how rich we all will be. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 214. See generally Roy, supra note 2. 
 215. See id. at 6–7 (discussing the group of schools and communities that have suffered 
violent actions by students). 
 216. Lucinda Roy, Learning More From the Tragedy at Virginia Tech, RICHMOND 
TIMES DISPATCH, May 31, 2009, at E01 (discussing the importance of open communication 
between people suffering school shooting tragedies in coming to a better understanding of 
how to prevent future school shootings). 
 217. Id. 
